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In the shadow of the Supreme Court's constitutional federalism 
doctrines, 1 lower federal courts have developed doctrines of common 
1. For recent cases developing constitutional federalism doctrine, see, e.g., Alden v. 
Maine, 119 S. Ct. 2240 (1999) (establishing state sovereign inlmunity from suits brought un­
der federal law in state court); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (limiting con­
gressional power under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to control state action); 
Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (forbidding congressional action that co=an­
deers state officers); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (forbidding, under 
Tenth Amendment, congressional action that co=andeers state legislatures). For general 
discussions of federalism doctrine, see, e.g., Barry Friedman, Valuing Federalism, 82 MINN. 
L. REV. 317 (1997); Edward Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism, Some Notes on a Na­
tional Neurosis, 41 UCLA L. REV. 903 (1994). On the federalism cases of the Court's most 
recent term, see Linda Greenhouse, States Are Given New Legal Shield by Supreme Court, 
N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 1999, at Al,("[I]t was also strikingly apparent that the fault line that 
runs through the current Court as an all but unbridgeable gulf has to do not with the higher 
profile issues of race, religion, abortion, or due process, but with federalism."). 
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law federalism through vehicles such as abstention.2 In the environ­
mental law arena, courts have employed a number of abstention theo­
ries to dismiss citizen suits brought under federal statutes.3 The ap­
pearance of primary jurisdiction and Burford abstention in citizen 
suits brought under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act 
("RCRA")4 exemplifies this trend. 
In rejecting RCRA suits, some courts have relied on primary juris­
diction, a doctrine conceived as a mechanism to allocate responsibility 
for limited fact-finding between courts and agencies, to dismiss RCRA 
citizen suits. These courts have emphasized the technical nature of 
evaluating RCRA violations and the superiority of state agencies as 
the bodies to address such issues.5 Although primary jurisdiction often 
allows the plaintiff to return to court following agency resolution of 
particular issues,6 RCRA dismissals under the doctrine may be so 
open-ended that they are effectively final.7 Because RCRA creates an 
exclusively federal cause of action,8 dismissals leave citizen plaintiffs 
with no judicial forum. 
2. Little systematic study has been devoted to how lower federal courts are applying ab­
stention doctrines. See Gordon G. Young, Federal Court Abstention and State Administra­
tive Law from Burford to Ankenbrandt: Fifty Years of Judicial Federalism Under Burford v. 
Sun Oil and Kindred Doctrines, 42 DEPAUL L. REV. 859, 982-83 (1993) (suggesting a longi­
tudinal study that would assist the Supreme Court in fashioning abstention doctrine). 
3. Other abstention doctrines cropping up in environmental cases generally, but not dis­
cussed in this Note, include the Colorado River doctrine, the Pullman doctrine, and Younger 
abstention. See William Daniel Benton, Application of Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel 
to EPA Overfiling, 16 B.C. ENVIL. AFF. L. REV. 199, 270-78 (1988). The Colorado River 
doctrine has made a few recent appearances in RCRA suits. See Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. 
Mobil Corp., No. CIV.A.96CV1781RSP/DNH, 1998 WL 160820, at *5 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 
1998) (refusing to abstain under Colorado River); Morton College Board of Trustees v. 
Town of Cicero, 18 F. Supp. 2d 921, 928-29 (N.D. Ill. 1998) (same). The doctrine's prerequi­
sites are so exhaustive, however, that it seems unlikely to become the basis for dismissal of 
many future RCRA citizen suits. See Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United 
States, 424 U.S. 800, 817-20 (1976) (requiring parallel state and federal suits and a considera­
tion of many factors to justify application of the doctrine). 
4. 42 U.S.C.A. § 6901 et seq. (West 1997); see also § 6902(b) ("National Policy": "The 
Congress hereby declares it to be the national policy of the United States that, wherever fea­
sible, the generation of hazardous waste is to be reduced or eliminated as expeditiously as 
possible. Waste that is nevertheless generated should be treated, stored, or disposed of so as 
to minimize the present and future threat to human health and the environment."). 
5. See Davies v. National Coop. Refinery Ass'n, 963 F. Supp. 990, 997-998 (D. Kan. 
1997); Friends of Santa Fe County v. LAC Minerals, Inc., 892 F. Supp. 1333, 1349-50 
(D.N.M. 1995); Carroll v. Litton Systems, Inc., No. B-C-88-253, 1990 WL 312969, at *209 
(W.D.N.C. Oct. 29, 1990). 
6. See Louis L. Jaffe, Primary Jurisdiction, 77 HARV. L. REV. 1037, 1038 (1964). 
7. See, e.g., Davies, 963 F. Supp. at 997-98. In that case, the federal court declined juris­
diction with no specifications about the conditions under which plaintiffs might return to 
court. See 963 F. Supp. at 1000. The court did not return the matter to the agency's jurisdic­
tion for any factual determinations or pending an agency enforcement proceeding, but 
rather deferred generally to the agency's power. See 963 F. Supp. at 1000. 
8. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 6972. The Sixth Circuit recently splintered off from the previously 
unanimous view that RCRA's citizen suit causes of action are exclusively federal. See Davis 
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Other courts have applied the doctrine of Burford abstention, 
which allows federal court dismissal where adjudication would involve 
complicated questions of state law or would interfere with a state's at­
tempts to develop a regulatory scheme. Although the appellate courts 
that have invoked Burford abstention have only addressed suits that 
challenged permitting or siting decisions,9 lower courts have applied 
the reasoning to abstain from RCRA citizen suits more generally. 
District courts using these rulings have extended the use of Burford to 
cases where the plaintiffs sought to redress RCRA violations or en­
dangering conditions.10 Burford claims have arisen with increasing 
frequency in RCRA suits,11 probably because RCRA's jurisdictional 
provisions are too clear to allow for disputes about when the statute 
precludes a claim. 
Courts that have employed these doctrines have ignored the 
explicit goals and jurisdictional structure of RCRA. In enacting the 
comprehensive statutory and regulatory provisions of RCRA, 
Congress adopted a scheme of environmental law with national 
minimum standards and provisions for federal court enforcement. To 
facilitate judicial oversight, Congress created two federal causes of 
action for citizen suits in addition to EPA and state regulatory 
enforcement.12 The statute also articulates the limited circumstances 
under which a citizen suit is barred: if either the state agency or the 
EPA has already commenced an enforcement action regarding the 
v. Sun Oil Co. , 148 F. 3d 606 (6th Cir. 1998). This Note rejects this novel approach. See infra 
notes 65-79 and accompanying text. 
9. See Coalition for Health Concern v. LWD, Inc., 60 F. 3d 1188, 1189-90 (6th Cir. 1995) 
(plaintiffs claimed that hazardous waste facility was operating without a final permit); Sug­
arloaf Citizens Ass'n v. Montgomery County, 3 3  F. 3d 52 (4th Cir. 1994) (unpublished dispo­
sition) (plaintiffs challenged issuance of permits for an incinerator facility); Palumbo v. 
Waste Techs. Indus., 989 F.2d 156, 159-60 (4th Cir. 199 3) (same). 
10. See Davies, 96 3 F. Supp. at 998-99 (abstaining where state agency had created a re­
medial plan, but no court action had been undertaken); Friends of Santa Fe County, 892 F. 
Supp. at 1 347-48 (state agency and defendants had reached stipulated agreement after ad­
ministrative proceedings). 
11. Burford claims are also raised in suits brought under other federal environmental 
statutes. The Fifth Circuit, for example, recently applied Burford in the context of an En­
dangered Species Act case. See Sierra Club v. San Antonio, 112 F. 3d 789 (5th Cir. 1997), cert. 
denied, 118 S. Ct. 879 (1998). 
12. These causes of action include an enforcement action that encourages private plain­
tiffs to fill in enforcement gaps where the EP A or state agency has not noticed or decided 
not to pursue an alleged violation, see 42 U. S. C. A. § 6972(a)(l)( A) ("[A]ny person may 
commence a civil action on his own behalf-against any person . . .  who is alleged to be in 
violation of any permit, standard, regulation, condition, requirement, prohibition, or order 
which has become effective pursuant to this chapter . . . .  "), and where there is an "imminent 
and substantial endangerment" cause of action, see § 6972(a)(l)(B) ("against any person . . .  
who has contributed . . .  to the past or present handling, storage, treatment, transportation, 
or disposal of any solid or hazardous waste which may present an imminent and substantial 
endangerment to health or the environment"). 
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alleged violation,13 or if plaintiffs are using the citizen suit as a way to 
challenge the terms of a permit or a determination as to where a 
particular facility will be located.14 These statutory limits determine 
precisely when a federal court must dismiss a RCRA citizen suit. 
This Note argues that dismissals based on the primary jurisdiction 
and Burford abstention doctrines violate the enforcement approach 
developed by Congress under RCRA and constitute judicial rule­
making beyond the established boundaries of the two doctrines. Part I 
argues that the policy concerns underlying the primary jurisdiction 
doctrine make it inapplicable for dismissals of RCRA citizen suits be­
cause RCRA's statutory scheme depends on federal court oversight, 
not agency independence, to ensure uniformity. Part II turns to the 
Burford doctrine, describing the local law focus of the doctrine and 
demonstrating that the explicitly federally centered statutory scheme 
makes RCRA suits inappropriate candidates for Burford abstention. 
Part II also asserts that because citizen suits challenging state-issued 
permits - the factual setting in which the Fourth and Sixth Circuits 
have employed Burford abstention - are outside of the statute's ju­
risdictional grant, invocation of Burford in that setting is unnecessary. 
Part III addresses the suitability of the primary jurisdiction and Bur­
ford doctrines as methods for creating a judicially fashioned theory of 
federalism. This Part argues that in the RCRA context, federal court 
abstention does not productively further a more state-centered vision 
of cooperative federalism. This Note concludes that abstention theo­
ries are inappropriate in the context of an expansive federal statutory 
scheme, and that, absent constitutional infirmities, policy judgments as 
to the wisdom of such federal regulation should be left to Congress. 
I. PRIMARY JURISDICTION 
Primary jurisdiction, often discussed by courts along with the 
Burford doctrine in the context of RCRA citizen suits,15 allows a court 
13. See § 6972 (b)(l)(B), (b)(2)(B), (C). Courts have consistently interpreted "enforce­
ment action" under RCRA as requiring an actual civil penalty action in a court, not simply 
agency review or monitoring of possible violations. See Morris v. Primetime Stores of Kan­
sas, Inc., No. 95-1328-JTM, 1996 WL 563845, at *3 (D. Kan. Sept. 5, 1996) (interpreting 
RCRA); City of Toledo v. Beazer Materials & Servs., Inc., 833 F. Supp. 646, 656-57 (N.D. 
Ohio 1993) (interpreting 42 U.S.C. § 6972(b)(l)(B)). 
14. See § 6976. 
15. This Note addresses primary jurisdiction because it has met with some limited suc­
cess as a ground for abstention, and because many of its policy goals intertwine with those of 
the Burford doctrine. See PMC, Inc. v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 151 F.3d 610, 619 (7th Cir. 
1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 871 (1999) (Posner, C.J.) (defendant's requests for dismissal 
based on Burford or primary jurisdiction "amount to the same thing"); James C. Rehnquist, 
Taking Comity Seriously: How to Neutralize the Abstention Doctrine, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1049, 
1076-77 (1994) (factors cited in favor of Burford abstention "virtually identical" to those 
cited in favor of primary jurisdiction). 
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to allocate jurisdiction between itself and an administrative agency 
where the forums share the ability to decide one or more of the issues 
at stake in the lawsuit.16 The doctrine, first articulated by the Supreme 
Court in Texas and Pacific Railway Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 
allows a court either to stay its jurisdiction or to grant a dismissal 
pending a hearing before the agency.17 
Four policy concerns underlying primary jurisdiction are fre­
quently discussed in the RCRA context. As a prerequisite to applying 
the primary jurisdiction doctrine, the statutory scheme at issue must 
be vague about whether a court or an agency should assume jurisdic­
tion over a matter.18 Second, the doctrine is appropriate only where 
the relevant legislative body specifically holds an agency responsible 
for providing uniform application of a statute,19 or where a statute dic­
tates that an agency's particular duties supersede those of the court.20 
A court must not defer where the federal judiciary provides the only 
guarantee that a federal statutory scheme is uniformly applied.21 
16. See Port of Boston Marine Terminal Ass'n v. Rederiaktiebolaget Transatlantic, 400 
U.S. 62, 68 (1970) ("[T]his Court [has] recognized . . .  that coordination between traditional 
judicial machinery and these agencies was necessary . . . . The doctrine of primary jurisdic­
tion has become one of the key judicial switches through which this current has passed."). 
17. See Sidney A. Shapiro, Abstention and Primary Jurisdiction: Two Chips Off the Same 
Block?-A Comparative Analysis, 60 CORNELL L. REV. 75, 76 {1974). Theoretically, pri­
mary jurisdiction allows a court to stay jurisdiction temporarily pending agency resolution of 
a specific factual issue, not to avoid adjudication of a suit altogether. In effect, however, the 
"stay" might amount to a permanent end to federal court jurisdiction. See Kenneth F. 
Hoffman, The Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction Misconceived: End to Common Law Envi­
ronmental Protection?, 2 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 491, 497 (1974) {discussing case law where 
plaintiffs have no remedy once primary jurisdiction is invoked by the federal court). 
18. See Jaffe, supra note 6, at 1041 ("It is undoubtedly an implied aspect of the statutory 
purpose that a specialized administrative tribunal has been created to deal with problems in 
a certain area . . . But a grant of power implies a limit, and the simultaneous grant of juris­
diction to the courts or a failure to abolish jurisdiction potentially conflicting may indicate 
where that limit is."). 
19. See United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 353 {1963) (noting that 
primary jurisdiction "requires judicial abstention in cases where protection of the integrity of 
a regulatory scheme dictates preliminary resort to the agency which administers the 
scheme"); Texas & Pacific Ry. Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S. 426, 440-41 {1907) 
(federal court judgment might impair Interstate Co=erce Commission's ability to impose 
uniform freight rates for co=on carriers, the duty assigned to it by statute). 
20. See Keogh v. Chicago & NW Ry. Co., 260 U.S. 156, 162 {1922) {staying jurisdiction 
because regulatory powers of the ICC superseded private plaintiff's remedy under the 
Sherman Act). 
21. Courts are split over whether a federal court may ever defer to a state, rather than to 
a federal agency, under primary jurisdiction. In the type of RCRA case relevant to this 
Note, where the acting agency is a state body, agency action might never provide the requi­
site authority for deferral. Compare County of Suffolk v. Long Island Lighting Co., 907 F.2d 
1295, 1310 {2d Cir. 1990) {primary jurisdiction generally unsuitable basis for federal court 
deference to jurisdiction of a state administrative agency), and Sierra Club v. United States 
DOE, 734 F. Supp. 946, 951 {D. Colo. 1990) (interpreting RCRA, and holding that a federal 
court may not defer to a state agency on a matter of federal law), with Friends of Santa Fe 
County v. LAC Minerals, Inc., 892 F. Supp. 1333, 1349 (D.N.M. 1995) (applying primary ju­
risdiction in favor of state agency). 
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Third, courts have applied primary jurisdiction where a statute relies 
on an agency's technical specialization as a factfinder.22 Finally, pri­
mary jurisdiction may cure various problems arising when an agency 
and a court share jurisdiction in a way that affects the regulation of a 
particular defendant.23 The assessment of each of these concerns turns 
on the purposes of the statute and the roles assigned to each govern­
mental body acting under it.24 
This Part argues that each of these concerns weighs against apply­
ing primary jurisdiction to RCRA citizen suits.25 Section I.A examines 
the jurisdictional grant under the statute and demonstrates that this 
framework represents a codified system of court/agency roles needing 
no further judicial articulation. Section LB argues that the main policy 
underlying primary jurisdiction, ensuring the uniform application of a 
statute, weighs against the doctrine's application to RCRA suits be­
cause RCRA's statutory scheme relies on federal courts, not state 
agencies, to provide such uniformity. Section LC rejects the view that 
the issue of an agency's technical specialization favors dismissing 
RCRA citizen suits on primary jurisdiction grounds because the stat­
ute allocates resources for courts to achieve proficiency. Section I.D 
concludes that the various issues raised by potentially conflicting court 
and agency action do not require the application of primary jurisdic­
tion in the RCRA context. 
A. Notice and Preclusion 
RCRA's jurisdictional provisions are so specific that they leave the 
22. See Nader v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 426 U.S. 290, 303-04 (1976) {discussing appli­
cation of primary jurisdiction where an issue "involves technical questions of fact uniquely 
within the expertise and experience of an agency such as matters turning on an assessment of 
industry conditions" (citations omitted)). 
23. See Davies v. National Coop. Refinery Ass'n, 963 F. Supp. 990, 998 (D. Kan. 1997) 
(existence of agency proceedings deemed relevant regarding possible conflicting orders, 
venue for plaintiffs, diligence of agency in pursuing action); Friends of Santa Fe County, 892 
F. Supp. at 1350 (considering whether agency and court determinations might impose con­
flicting obligations on the defendant as part of primary jurisdiction analysis). 
24. See Craig Lyle Ltd. Partnership v. Land O'Lakes, Inc., 877 F. Supp. 476, 483 (D. 
Minn. 1995) {doctrine must be consistent with congressional intent underlying the statute); 
see also Jaffe, supra note 6, at 1041 (statutory purpose should underlie application of primary 
jurisdiction). 
25. Primary jurisdiction has been less successful than Burford as a ground for RCRA 
citizen suit dismissals. See, e.g., Craig Lyle Ltd., 877 F. Supp. at 483 (primary jurisdiction 
generally disfavored for federal citizen suits); Sierra Club, 734 F. Supp. at 950-51; United 
States EPA v. Environmental Waste Control, Inc., 710 F. Supp. 1172, 1194-95 (N.D. Ind. 
1989), (concluding that application of primary jurisdiction would thwart legislative intent of 
RCRA) affd, 917 F.2d 327 (7th Cir. 1990); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. 
Wheelabrator Tech. Inc., 725 F. Supp. 758, 775 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (refusing to apply primary 
jurisdiction pending EPA review where issue involved statutory construction); Merry v. 
Westinghouse Elec. Corp. 697 F. Supp. 180, 182-83 (M.D. Pa. 1988) (stating that primary 
jurisdiction should be invoked sparingly in the citizen suit context). 
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federal courts with no opportunity to assert jurisdictional discretion. 
This congressional guidance dictates that a federal court must assume 
jurisdiction when a citizen suit meets the jurisdictional requirements of 
the statute.26 
The first jurisdictional limitation allows suit only when notice re­
quirements have been met. Citizen plaintiffs must provide notice to 
any potential defendant, the EPA, and the state administrative agency 
prior to commencing suit.27 This notice mechanism allows the state or 
the EPA to prevent a citizen suit altogether by filing its own action 
against the defendant28 or by compelling compliance before the citizen 
suit can commence.29 
The specific window of time in which an alleged violator may cor­
rect problems without court involvement defines the role of state 
agencies within the context of citizen suits.30 Rather than dismissing a 
case under an abstention doctrine in order to allow state participation 
in the remedying of violations, federal courts need only ascertain that 
the plaintiff has properly complied with the statutory notice provi­
sions. Observance of this notice rule guarantees that states have an 
opportunity to participate in the cooperative scheme without jeop­
ardizing RCRA's mandate for timely remediation of solid and hazard­
ous waste violations.31 
26. See Trident Inv. Management, Inc. v. Bhambra, No. 95 C 4260, 1995 WL 736940, at 
*2 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 11, 1995) (RCRA's statutory terms override co=on law doctrine of pri­
mary jurisdiction); Sierra Club, 734 F. Supp. at 951-52 (same); Werlein v. United States, 746 
F. Supp 887, 892 n.4 (D. Minn. 1990) (vacated in part on other grounds) (finding RCRA's 
jurisdictional limits under 42 U.S.C. § 6972(b )(2)(B) to be a codification of primary jurisdic­
tion). But see Davies, 963 F. Supp. at 997-99 (applying primary jurisdiction); Friends of Santa 
Fe County, 892 F. Supp. at 1348-51 (same). 
27. Plaintiffs must provide 60-days notice under the enforcement provision of the stat­
ute, see 42 U.S.C.A. § 6972(b)(l)(A) (West 1997), and 90-days notice under the inrminent 
endangerment authority, See § 6972(b)(2)(A). Plaintiff must give notice before filing suit. 
Effective notice, or the staying of an action pending post-filing notice, is not permitted. See 
Hallstrom v. Tallamook County, 493 U.S. 20, 29 (1989). 
28. See 42 U.S.C. § 6972(b)(l)(B) (prohibiting citizen suit where the EPA or state has 
filed an enforcement action); Hallstrom, 493 U.S. at 29 ("[N]otice allows Government agen­
cies to take responsibility for enforcing environmental regulations, thus obviating the need 
for citizen suits."). 
29. See Hallstrom, 493 U.S. at 29 ("[N]otice gives the alleged violator 'an opportunity to 
bring itself into complete compliance with the Act and thus likewise render unnecessary a 
citizen suit.' " (citing Gwaltney of Smithfield, Inc. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 
49, 60 (1987))). 
30. See Wilson v. Amoco Corp., 989 F. Supp. 1159, 1170 (D. Wyo. 1998) (stating that 
invoking primary jurisdiction would abandon statutorily-imposed duty); Trident Inv. 
Management, 1995 WL 736940, at *2 (rejecting primary jurisdiction for RCRA citizen suit, 
noting that statutory notice requirements provide acco=odation of agency and court 
actions). 
31. To the extent that courts find endangerment challenges more sympathetic candi­
dates for abstention than enforcement suits, the notice provisions are more generous for the 
former type of suit. See supra note 28 
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The second limitation on jurisdiction prohibits a citizen suit if the 
EPA or state agency is diligently prosecuting its own action under 
RCRA or a specific sister statute.32 By specifying that only formal 
court action bars citizen suit litigation, Congress implicitly instructed 
federal courts not to treat various administrative activities, such as in­
spections of a site or compliance agreements between an alleged viola­
tor and the state agency, as jurisdictional hurdles.33 Courts have 
unanimously understood the statutory bar to require court action, not 
simply administrative inquiry.34 
Together, the notice provisions and preclusion language create a 
clear path guiding federal court jurisdiction over RCRA citizen suits. 
Accordingly, RCRA does not leave open the kind of jurisdictional 
gaps required for an application of the primary jurisdiction doctrine. 
B. Uniformity, Broad Enforcement, and the Federal Courts 
The task of ensuring uniform application of RCRA falls upon the 
federal courts rather than state agencies. Minimum national standards 
are a core component of RCRA's mandate, and the broad enforce­
ment mechanisms embedded in the statute charge federal courts with 
guaranteeing those minimums. Without that oversight, state agencies 
act in isolation and will develop disparate standards for solid and haz­
ardous waste disposal.35 
32. Under section 6972(b)(l){B), only diligent prosecution of "a civil or criminal action 
in a court" precludes a citi2en enforcement suit. For citizen endangerment suits, an action 
may be precluded by an action in a court, by EPA or state action under the Comprehensive 
Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act ("CERCLA"), 42 U.S.C.A. § 
9606 et seq., or by an EPA suit under its own endangerment authority pursuant to section 
6973 of RCRA, see § 6972{b)(2){B), {C). 
33. See PMC, Inc. v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 151 F.3d 610, 619 (7th Cir. 1998), cert. de­
nied, 119 S. Ct. 871 (1999) ("Congress has specified the conditions under which the pendency 
of other proceedings bars suit under RCRA, and . . .  those conditions have not been satisfied 
here [where agency had corresponded with the defendant]."); Proffitt v. Commissioners, 754 
F.2d 504, 506 {3d Cir. 1985) (overruled on other grounds) (no preclusion where EPA had 
entered a compliance order against the defendant); Morris v. Primetime Stores of Kansas, 
Inc., No. 95-1328-JTM, 1996 WL 563845, at *3 (D. Kan. Sept. 5, 1996) (no preclusion where 
a state agency and the defendant were developing a remediation plan); City of Toledo v. 
Beazer Materials & Servs., Inc., 833 F. Supp. 646, 657 (N.D. Ohio 1993) (holding that state 
agency proceedings absent action in a court are insufficient to bar a RCRA citizen suit); cf. 
Davies v. National Coop. Refinery Ass'n, 963 F. Supp. 990, 997 (D. Kan. 1997) (although 
abstaining on other grounds, conceding that statutory jurisdiction exists where defendants 
and state agency had entered into a consent order). 
34. The statutory language in RCRA has prevented the kind of court disagreement that 
has taken place in interpreting the analogous provision of the Clean Water Act. The Clean 
Water Act prohibits suit where the state is prosecuting an action "comparable" to a citizen 
suit action. See 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g)(6){A). For a discussion of the Clean Water Act dilemma, 
see Arne R. Leonard, When Should an Administrative Enforcement Action Preclude a Citi­
zen Suit Under the Clean Water Act?, 35 NAT. REsOURCES J. 555, 579-617 (1995). 
35. See County of Suffolk v. Long Island Lighting Co., 907 F.2d 1295, 1310 {2d Cir. 1990) 
{"The uniformity rationale clearly does not support application of the [primary jurisdiction] 
doctrine in the federal question/state agency context. Indeed, since application . . .  might 
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Under RCRA, Congress has determined that solid and hazardous 
waste disposal is a matter of national concern.36 The statute delineates 
this focus clearly, concluding that "while the collection and disposal of 
solid wastes should continue to be primarily the function of State, re­
gional, and local agencies, the problems of waste disposal ... have be­
come a matter national in scope and in concern and necessitate Fed­
eral action .... "37 Moreover, Congress enacted national legislation 
because piecemeal efforts by the states had proved inadequate to ad­
dress U.S. waste disposal problems.38 
To enforce minimum national standards, RCRA empowers the 
EPA and citizens with broad enforcement authority. The EPA may 
bring either a civil or criminal suit to enforce alleged RCRA viola­
tions 39 and may also bring a suit if some activity creates an "imminent 
hazard" justifying injunctive relief, regardless of whether the activity 
involves a permit violation.40 The EP A's ongoing role demonstrates 
that the statutory scheme seeks to promote federal guidelines, not to 
sanction diverse regulatory policies in individual states. 
Citizen suit availability acts as a crucial complement to EPA en­
forcement suits in supplying uniformity. Courts have understood the 
overarching purpose of citizen suits as creating private attorneys gen­
eral that supplement governmental enforcement of a regulatory 
scheme.41 In amending RCRA, Congress specifically recognized that 
the EPA alone had been unable to enforce the statute.42 Accordingly, 
well result in review by fifty different state agencies with fifty different charters, resort to 
state agencies is more likely to ensure non-uniformity."). 
36. See 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 6901(a)(4) (West 1997); 6902(a) (captioned "Objectives and na­
tional.policy," and including objectives of "establishing a viable Federal-State partnership" 
and "promoting a national research and development program"). 
37. § 6901(a)(4). 
38. See David R. Hodas, Symposium, Environmental Federalism: Enforcement of Envi­
ronmental Law in a Triangular Federal System: Can Three Not Be a Crowd When Enforce­
ment Authority ls Shared by the United States, the States and Their Citizens?, 54 Mo. L. REV. 
1552, 1615-16 (1995) (discussing states reluctant to pursue penalties because it deters busi­
nesses from settling there and noting that competitive issues also drive local government en­
forcement). 
39. See § 6928. 
40. See § 6973. 
41. See Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 165 (1997). For examples of citizen suit provi­
sions under other environmental statutes, see, e.g., 33 U.S.C.A. § 1365(a) (Clean Water 
Act); 42 U.S.C.A. § 7604(a) (Clean Air Act), 42 U.S.C.A. § 9659(a) (CERCLA)), and 42 
U.S.C.A. § 11046(a) (Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act). 
42. See H.R. REP. No. 98-198, pt. 1, at 20 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5576, 
5579; see also Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Dissecting the State: The Use of Federal Law to Free 
State and Local Officials from State Legislatures' Control, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1201, 1226-28 
(1999) (discussing problems of federal government in monitoring and sanctioning states re­
garding grant-in-aid programs); Michael J. Scicchitano & David M. Hedge, From Coercion 
to Partnership in Federal Partial Preemption: SMCRA, RCRA, and OSH Act, PUBLIUS, Fall 
1993, at 107, 114 (categorizing EPA threat of revoking state's status as an approved program 
as an empty one). 
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in order to maximize federal court oversight, two aspects of RCRA's 
citizen suit provisions are particularly broad. 
First, RCRA's double grant of federal court jurisdiction for citizen 
suits features an imminent endangerment provision that is unique to 
RCRA among federal environmental statutes,43 allows suit against 
both past and present contributors,44 and assesses liability without 
fault.45 The jurisdictional grant both for enforcement and imminent 
endangerment allows a wide variety of environmental harms to be ac­
tionable under RCRA's statutory mandate. 
Second, the statute provides generous standing for potential citizen 
plaintiffs. Unlike some federal environmental statutes, which impose 
a zone-of-interests requirement for the establishment of statutory 
standing,46 RCRA's standing provision allows "any person" to bring 
suit.47 In choosing this language, Congress conferred standing to the 
fullest extent permitted by Article III.48 Congress created the broadest 
possible class of potential plaintiffs in order to maximize the number 
of private "enforcers" and to avoid dismissals in federal court based 
on lack of standing.49 
Through its extensive jurisdictional grants for citizen- and EPA­
initiated suits, RCRA charges federal courts, not state agencies, with 
enforcing the statute and overseeing its uniform application. Applica­
tions of primary jurisdiction frustrate the realization of federal court 
oversight.50 
43. See Ashley C. Schannauer, RCRA Endangerment Actions: ls a Permit a Defense?, 21 
COLUM. J. ENVrL. L. 287, 303 (1996) (endangerment authority under other statutes limited 
to the government). 
44. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 6972(a)(l)(B) (West 1997). 
45. See H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 98-1133, at 119 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
5649, 5690 (endangerment provision in§ 7003 applies "regardless of fault or negligence"). 
46. See Bennett, 520 U.S. at 164-65. The Bennett Court reasoned that its broad construc­
tion of statutory standing for "any person" under the Endangered Species Act ("ESA") was 
supported by the fact that the statute was environmental, and that Congress was obviously 
attempting to create "private attorneys general." 520 U.S. at 165. The Court also noted that 
the "any person" language was much broader than in some other environmental statutes, 
which create a zone-of-interests requirement. 520 U.S. at 164-65. 
47. § 6972(a) ("any person may commence a civil action on his own behalf'). 
48. See Bennett, 520 U.S. at 165. 
49. See Bennett, 520 U.S. at 165. 
50. See Craig Lyle Ltd. Partnership v. Land O'Lakes, Inc., 877 F. Supp. 476, 483 (D. 
Minn. 1995) (stating that primary jurisdiction stay would defeat congressional intent in cre­
ating citizen suits under RCRA); United States EPA v. Waste Control, Inc., 710 F. Supp. 
1172, 1184 (N.D. Ind. 1989), aff d, 917 F.2d 327 (7th Cir. 1990); Merry v. Westinghouse Elec. 
Corp., 697 F. Supp. 180, 183 (M.D. Pa. 1988) (stating that primary jurisdiction could "frus­
trate the congressional intent to broaden enforcement authority"); see also Proffitt v. Rohm 
& Haas, 850 F.2d 1007 (3d Cir. 1988) (overruled on other grounds) (stating that application 
of primary jurisdiction would frustrate purposes of the Oean Water Act). 
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C. Technical Expertise 
The third justification for primary jurisdiction, that the court 
should defer to an administrative body with specialized competence in 
a particular area,51 is a tempting rationale in favor of applying the doc­
trine to RCRA citizen suits. There is no dispute that RCRA is a com­
plicated statute52 and that environmental regulations involve complex 
technical matters that federal courts may not commonly encounter.53 
It is understandable that a judge might prefer to transfer jurisdiction 
to a state agency whose sole function is to interpret and apply envi­
ronmental regulations. 
What such deferrals depend on, however, is not the claim that a 
federal court cannot properly adjudicate the issues before it, but that it 
would be time-consuming for the court to acquire an understanding of 
the complicated factual and legal issues.54 Because Congress has al­
ready chosen to allocate federal court resources to this problem by en­
acting RCRA's citizen suit provisions,55 a federal court judge may not 
reallocate resources away from federal court jurisdiction. The statu­
tory jurisdictional grant indicates that Congress expects federal courts 
to devote the time necessary to acquire competence in the issues pre­
sented by a RCRA suit.56 
51. See Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Merchants Elevator Co., 259 U.S. 285, 291 {1922) 
{finding that determination of issue requires evaluation of facts known only to "body of ex­
perts," members of ICC). 
52 See 4 WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW § 7.13, at 113 {1992) 
{"The EPA's graphic on the RCRA permitting process looks something like the organiza­
tional chart of the Prussian army . . . .  "); Randolph L. Hill, An Overview of RCRA: The 
"Mind-Numbing" Provisions of the Most Complicated Environmental Statute, 21 ENVTL. L. 
REP., May 1991, at 10254. 
53. See Davies v. National Coop. Refinery Ass'n, 963 F. Supp. 990, 997 {D. Kan. 1997) 
(court adjudication would involve determining the threat posed by particular levels of 
hazardous waste and choice of remedial measures); Friends of Santa Fe County v. LAC 
Minerals, Inc., 892 F. Supp. 1333, 1349-1350 (D.N.M. 1995) (court less institutionally suited 
for developing remedial plan). 
54. See Davies, 963 F. Supp. at 997 {adjudication would duplicate extensive agency fact­
finding); Friends of Santa Fe County, 892 F. Supp. at 1349-50 (reasoning that court could ac­
quire knowledge through expert testimony or appointment of a special master, but these 
methods would be a waste of judicial resources). 
55. See Hodas, supra note 38, at 1576 (" '[c]ongress has leveraged the scarce federal en­
forcement resources' " by creating citizen suits) (citation omitted). 
56. See Wilson v. Amoco Corp., 989 F. Supp. 1159, 1170 {D. Wyo. 1998) (issues under 
RCRA not too "esoteric" for judicial evaluation); Merry v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 697 F. 
Supp. 180, 183 (M.D. Pa. 1989). The Merry court, enforcing the CW A, whose requirements 
are similarly technical to those of RCRA, cited the CW A legislative history asserting that " 
'enforcement of pollution regulations is not a technical matter beyond the competence of the 
courts.' " Merry, 697 F. Supp. at 183 n.2 (citing S. REP. No. 92-414 {1972), reprinted in 1972 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3747). 
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D. Concurrent Proceedings 
The final consideration under the primary jurisdiction doctrine re­
lates to the problems raised by concurrent agency and court actions. 
Concurrent jurisdiction may require the court to make several inquir­
ies: whether continuing parallel proceedings might impose conflicting 
orders on the defendant;57 whether the administrative body will dili­
gently pursue the issue if the court stays or dismisses the judicial ac­
tion;58 and whether the federal court plaintiff will be able to obtain re­
lief from the administrative agency if the federal court stays the 
action.59 In the context of RCRA citizen suits, these issues do not jus­
tify application of the primary jurisdiction doctrine. 
The first concern, that agency and federal court involvement might 
result in conflicting obligations for the defendant, is simply not viable 
where the state and federal bodies operate as part of a single regula­
tory scheme. In order to receive authorization from the EPA, the 
state's program must be equivalent to the federal program: the state 
may not impose requirements less stringent than those in force under 
the federal regulations.60 Thus, a federal court's imposition of more 
stringent obligations on the defendant simply brings the state adminis­
trative rule back into compliance with the federal statute. Under the 
terms of RCRA's federal-state structure, relief granted by the federal 
court thus cannot create a "conflicting" order on the defendant be­
cause federal authority ultimately defines the defendant's statutory 
obligations. 
Second, rejecting primary jurisdiction keeps the meaning of "dili­
gence" consistent with RCRA's statutory standard as to what level of 
administrative diligence bars a citizen suit.61 RCRA specifies that only 
57. See Davies, 963 F. Supp. at 998; Friends of Santa Fe County, 892 F. Supp. at 1350. 
58. See Davies, 963 F. Supp. at 998; Friends of Santa Fe County, 892 F. Supp. at 1350. 
59. See Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 406 (1970) (primary jurisdiction inappropriate 
where agency had no procedure through which petitioners could seek review of adverse ad­
ministrative ruling). 
60. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 6929 (West 1997) (regarding hazardous waste plans); § 6947(a) 
(regarding state plans generally). As articulated in section 6929, nothing prohibits a state 
from developing more stringent guidelines than those required by RCRA. In a case where a 
citizen plaintiff claimed a violation under such a state law, however, there would not be a 
RCRA cause of action and abstention would not be an issue. 
61. See Trident Inv. Management, Inc. v. Bhambra, No. 95 C 4260, 1995 WL 736940, at 
*2 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 11, 1995) (holding that judicial restraint is defined not by common law 
primary jurisdiction doctrine, but by statutory mandate); Sierra Club v. United States DOE, 
734 F. Supp. 946, 951-52 (D. Colo. 1990) (holding that citizen suit goes forward unless agency 
is "diligently prosecuting" an action in a court pursuant to§ 6972(b)(l)(B)). But see Davies, 
963 F. Supp. at 998 (applying primary jurisdiction to RCRA citizen suit where agency had 
ongoing oversight over defendant); Friends of Santa Fe County, 892 F. Supp. at 1350 
(applying primary jurisdiction to RCRA citizen suit where agency proceedings preceded 
suit). 
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"diligent prosecut[ion]"62 by the EPA or state agency in a court bars a 
RCRA citizen suit. Given that statutory command, a federal court 
may not create a separate standard as to what level of administrative 
investigation is sufficient to dismiss a citizen suit. When federal courts 
have ignored the statutory definition of "diligence" in favor of defer­
ence to local agencies, communities have waited years for genuine en­
forcement of the statute.63 Such a result allows the old problems of 
purely local enforcement to resurface and thus defeats the purpose of 
enacting national legislation. 
The final policy concern, fairness to plaintiffs, particularly supports 
a rejection of primary jurisdiction in the citizen suit context. Because 
RCRA establishes exclusive federal causes of action for citizen suits,64 
citizen plaintiffs cannot take their cases to other tribunals.65 Federal 
court jurisdiction is thus necessary to allow plaintiffs access to the 
remedies provided by the statute. 66 
Until recently, the federal courts were in accord that the RCRA 
provision stating that citizen suits "shall be brought in the district 
court"6 7 confers exclusive jurisdiction on the federal courts.68 The 
Sixth Circuit recently defected from that view in Davis v. Sun Oil 
Co.,69 however, concluding that RCRA's jurisdictional language is in­
sufficient to overcome the strong presumption in favor of concurrent 
62 See § 6972{b){l){B), {6){2){B), {b){2)(C){i), {b){2){C)(iii). 
63. See Merry v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 697 F. Supp. 180, 183 (M.D. Pa. 1988) (stat­
ing that primary jurisdiction could allow state or federal government to frustrate congres­
sional intent "by delay in action or applications"). In one case where the court applied pri­
mary jurisdiction, it admitted that the administrative agency, which had failed to take action 
for fourteen years, did not appear to fare particularly well under primary jurisdiction's "dili­
gence" factor. The court concluded, however, that a stay of federal court jurisdiction was 
warranted because the agency was "on the verge of addressing remediation" of a contami­
nated site. Davies, 963 F. Supp. at 998. 
64. See § 6972{a). 
65. See Craig Lyle Ltd. Partnership v. Land O'Lakes, Inc., 877 F. Supp. 476, 483 (D. 
Minn. 1995) (primary jurisdiction would greatly reduce cases where plaintiffs could bring 
citizen suits). But see Friends of Santa Fe County, 972 F. Supp. at 1350 (applying primary ju­
risdiction, reasoning that plaintiffs could have pursued remedies through state court review 
of administrative determinations). 
66. The Supreme Court has not always considered comparable relief for plaintiffs in the 
administrative forum to be a necessary prerequisite for the application of primary jurisdic­
tion. See Ricci v. Chicago Mercantile Exch., 409 U.S. 289 (1973). Ricci applied the primary 
jurisdiction doctrine even though plaintiff had no right to initiate or intervene in a proceed­
ing before the administrative body. See Ricci, 409 U.S. at 311-12 {Marshall, J., dissenting). 
The majority, however, noted that if the agency refused to act, the federal court could again 
assume jurisdiction. See Ricci, 409 U.S. at 304 n.14. 
67. 42 U.S.C.A. § 6972{a) (West 1997) (emphasis added). 
68. See Fletcher v. United States, 116 F.3d 1315, 1327 {10th Cir. 1997); Reservation Tel. 
Coop. v. Three Affiliated Tribes of Fort Berthold Reservation, 76 F.3d 181, 185-86 (8th Cir. 
1996). 
69. Davis v. Sun Oil Co., 148 F.3d 606 (6th Cir. 1998) (state courts may also hear RCRA 
citizen suits). 
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jurisdiction. 70 That decision was misguided for two reasons. 
First, the court improperly relied on the Supreme Court's decision 
in Yellow Freight System, Inc. v. Donnelly.71 That case held that Title 
VII's jurisdictional language, providing that federal courts "shall have 
jurisdiction of actions," 72 did not confer exclusive jurisdiction on the 
federal courts. Yet Title VII's jurisdictional provision is easily distin­
guishable from RCRA's. The mandatory language of Title VII dis­
cusses only whether federal courts shall have jurisdiction in general, 
i.e., the power to· hear a case. 73 The language of RCRA, on the other 
hand, discusses where citizen plaintiffs must bring their suits. The Sun 
Oil court reached a contrary view only by narrowly focusing on the 
word "shall" without attention to the surrounding language. 
Second, the Supreme Court has elsewhere suggested that manda­
tory statutory language regarding where plaintiffs should bring suits 
would confer exclusive jurisdiction on the federal courts. In Taf!Un v. 
Levitt,74 the Court held that language in RICO, which reads that "[a]ny 
person injured . . .  may sue therfor [sic] in any appropriate United 
States district court," 75 did not establish exclusive jurisdiction.76 The 
Court noted that RICO "provides that suits of the kind described 
'may' be brought in the federal district courts, not that they must be."17 
This statement suggests that mandatory language such as "shall" in the 
place of "may" would have established exclusive jurisdiction.78 
*** 
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction allows courts to further the 
purposes of a statutory scheme by allocating jurisdiction already 
70. 148 F.3d at 611-612. 
71. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc. v. Donnelly, 494 U.S. 820, 825 (1990). 
72. Yellow Freight, 494 U.S. at 823 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3) (1982)). 
73. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 584(6th ed. 1991) (defining "Li]urisdiction of the 
subject matter" as "(p]ower of a particular court to hear the type of case that is then before 
it"). 
74. Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455 (1990). 
75. 493 U.S. at 460 (emphasis added by Court) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c)). 
76. 493 U.S. at 460. 
77. 493 U.S. at 460-61 (emphasis added) (quoting Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 
368 U.S. 502, 506 (1962)). 
78. The legislative history also supports the exclusive jurisdiction rule. The House Re· 
port addressed the concern that the cause of action would allow plaintiffs to bring many 
state law claims with their RCRA cause of action under the pendent jurisdiction doctrine. 
See H.R. REP. No. 98-198, pt. 1, at 118 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5576, 5634 
(stating minority views on the amendment, which complain that new burden on federal 
courts is "potentially crushing" and that federal court judges will have to tum to state courts 
for guidance during the course of the suit). No House member suggested the obvious solu· 
tion: that such mixed claims of federal and state law could be brought in state court. 
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shared by courts and agencies. Where, as in RCRA, the statute has 
explicitly delineated the jurisdictional relationship, a court cannot 
transfer its duties to an administrative body, particularly when those 
duties achieve the very goals that the primary jurisdiction doctrine 
seeks to protect. Beyond seeking an agency's opinion on a limited fac­
tual matter,79 a court should not decline jurisdiction of a RCRA citizen 
suit based on primary jurisdiction. 
II. BURFORD .ABSTENTION 
The Burford abstention doctrine seeks to protect "complex state 
administrative processes" from undue interference by the federal 
courts.80 Three core components are necessary for the application of 
the Burford doctrine: the presence in a case of "distinctively local 
regulatory facts or policies";81 a danger that federal court adjudication 
will disrupt a state's policy or regulatory framework on a broad basis;82 
and an assurance that the federal court plaintiffs will be able to pursue 
their claim in state courts if the federal court dismisses the matter.83 
The doctrine should be applied only in rare and compelling circum­
stances.84 The Supreme Court has described the federal courts' obliga­
tion to hear suits within their jurisdiction as "virtually unflagging."85 
This Part argues that application of the Burford doctrine is never 
appropriate for a federal statute like RCRA, which operates under a 
theory of cooperative federalism. Section II.A demonstrates that the 
federal focus of RCRA makes Burford abstention incompatible with 
RCRA citizen suits. Section II.B addresses the special problem of 
citizen suits brought as siting or permitting challenges and concludes 
79. This Note does not challenge more limited uses of primary jurisdiction, in which a 
court stays an action pending an agency's factual determination regarding a discrete issue. 
80. New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 362 (1989). 
81. 491 U.S. at 364. 
82. The Burford doctrine describes two types of such disruption: "(l) when there are 
'difficult questions of state [or local] law bearing on policy problems of substantial public 
import whose importance transcends the result in the case then at bar'; or (2) where the 'ex­
ercise of federal review of the question in a case and in similar cases would be disruptive of 
state efforts to establish a coherent policy with respect to a matter of substantial public con­
cern.' " New Orleans Pub. Serv., 491 U.S. at 361 (quoting Colorado River Water Conserva­
tion Dist v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 814 (1976)). 
83. See 491 U.S. at 361. This requirement seeks to assure a federal court considering ab­
stention that dismissing or staying the federal suit will not work an injustice on the individual 
litigants. See Burford v. Sun Oil, 319 U.S. 319 (1943). Such a system of state court review is 
simply a prerequisite for performing a Burford analysis, not a satisfaction of the test itself. 
See New Orleans Pub. Serv., 491 U.S. at 361; Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 814. 
84. See New Orleans Pub. Serv., 491 U.S. at 358. 
85. New Orleans Pub. Serv., 491 U.S. at 359 (citing Deakins v. Monaghan, 484 U.S. 193, 
203 (1988)). 
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that statutory bars, rather than Burford abstention, justify dismissal of 
such suits. 
A. RCRA's Federal Mandate 
RCRA citizen suits are singularly poor candidates for Burford ab­
stention. This section demonstrates that the cluster of issues necessary 
for an application of Burford abstention is not present in a RCRA 
citizen suit, which provides a federal cause of action and requires the 
application of federal law. Section II.A.1 addresses the "local law" 
requirement of Burford and argues that in passing RCRA, Congress 
explicitly defined waste disposal as a matter of national concern and 
developed a comprehensive federal statutory scheme. Section II.A.2 
illustrates that the concern that federal courts might interfere with a 
state's efforts to establish a coherent waste disposal policy is not rele­
vant in the RCRA context. Section II.A.3 demonstrates that federal 
courts that have applied Burford in situations where states have de­
veloped a specialized state court review system have mistaken a pre­
requisite for applying the doctrine for a satisfaction of its criteria. This 
error has allowed a circumvention of the federal focus of the statute. 
1. The Statutory Framework 
RCRA's comprehensive mandate deprives a federal court of the 
authority to define waste disposal as a local problem. As discussed in 
Part I, RCRA establishes waste disposal as a matter of national con­
cern.86 Unlike the particularly local issues held applicable for Burford 
abstention, a RCRA citizen suit presents a statutory federal cause of 
action to enforce national minimum standards and thus does not pro­
vide the types of state-based legal issues that would implicate Burford. 
Despite the statute's emphasis on the importance of national goals 
and federal enforcement, courts have varied in their assessments of 
whether a RCRA suit involves only "local" law.87 Courts that have 
dismissed RCRA citizen suits as local matters under Burford have 
done so under two theories. First, some courts have argued that an 
underlying issue in a RCRA case, land use generally, has traditionally 
86. See supra section J.B. 
87. See White & Brewer Trucking, Inc. v. Donley, 952 F. Supp. 1306, 1314 ( C.D. Ill. 
1997) (finding open dumping to be a national rather than local problem); Craig Lyle Ltd. 
Partnership v. Land O'Lakes, Inc., 877 F. Supp. 476, 484 (D. Minn. 1995) (ruling that under 
R CRA, " Congress has found the problems of solid and hazardous waste to be national as 
opposed to an "essentially local problem"). But see Coalition for Health Concern v. Natural 
Resources Defense Council, Inc., 60 F.3d 1188, 1194 (6th Cir. 1995) ("Kentucky has an over­
riding interest in the protection of its environment . . .  exercise of federal review would be 
disruptive of Kentucky's efforts to establish a coherent policy with respect to the licensing of 
hazardous waste facilities."). 
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been treated as a local problem.88 Second, others have claimed that 
once the EPA has authorized a state program to operate "in lieu"89 of 
RCRA's federal regulations, the issues at stake in a RCRA citizen suit 
become local matters suitable for abstention.90 Neither of these char­
acterizations is persuasive. 
The first rationale, based on the characterization of land use law as 
a local matter, ignores the fact that the specifically national attention 
given by Congress to solid and hazardous waste disposal overrides the 
traditional treatment of a general area of law.91 RCRA's clear na­
tional mandate does not allow retreat to the traditional view of waste 
disposal as a local land use issue. 
The applicability of the second theory, that an authorized state 
program transforms RCRA issues into local ones, ignores the relation­
ship between the approved program and the federal statute.92 In 
drafting and amending RCRA, Congress envisioned a cooperative re­
lationship between the federal government and the states.93 The leg­
islative history of the 1984 amendments to RCRA emphasizes the cen­
trality of a federal-state partnership to the statutory goals: 
The successful implementation of the 1984 amendments will require an 
improved working relationship between the Environmental Protection 
Agency and the states. The development of a viable federal-state part­
nership is one of the highest priorities of this legislation, and the agency 
should devote greater effort to assisting states in achieving authorization 
of their RCRA programs.94 
88. See Sugarloaf Citizens Ass'n v. Montgomery County, No. 9 3-2475, 1994 WL 447442, 
at * 3  (4th Cir. Aug. 17, 1994). 
89. See, e.g., 42 U.S. C. A. § 6926 (West 1997) (regarding approval of state programs per­
taining to hazardous waste disposal). 
90. See Coalition for Health Concern, 60 F. 3d at 1194. The court abstained because 
plaintiff's R CR A  clainls did not "arise in isolation from state law issues." 60 F. 3d at 1194. 
This formulation deviates from established confines of the Burford test and would bring a 
wide array of cases with mixed issues of federal and state law into the realm of the Burford 
doctrine. 
91. See White & Brewer Trucking, 952 F. Supp. at 1 314; Craig Lyle Ltd., 877 F. Supp. at 
484; Sierra Club v. United States D OE, 7 34 F. Supp. 946, 947 (D. Colo. 1990) (noting that 
state regulations essentially mirror those of the EP A and concluding that "analysis of the 
federal scheme [R CR A] overlays and defines that of Colorado"); see also supra section J.B. 
92. This Note does not address the issue of whether state law operating "in lieu" of the 
federal regulations with EP A approval preempts a R CR A  citizen suit, even though the EP A 
may still bring an enforcement or endangerment action. Most courts have rejected this view. 
See Acme Printing Ink Co. v. Menard, Inc., 881 F. Supp. 12 37, 1244 (E.D. Wis. 1995) (re­
jecting preemption theory and collecting cases with both views). The position of the EP A is 
that citizen suit availability is not preempted by state authorization. See 49 Fed. Reg. 48, 300, 
48, 304 (1984); see also Adam Babich, Is RCRA Enforceable by Citizen Suit in States with 
Authorized Hazardous Waste Programs?, 23 ENVfL. L. REP. 10, 56 (Sept 199 3) (arguing no 
preemption). 
9 3. See supra notes 37, 87. 
94. H.R. CONF. REP. 98-11 3 3, at 81 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S. C. C.AN. 5649, 5651. 
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While the statute promotes state implementation of solid and haz­
ardous waste disposal programs, such plans are approved and con­
stantly overseen at the federal level to maintain their conformance 
with the RCRA guidelines.95 Because the federal guidelines control 
and shape state programs operating pursuant to them, there is no am­
biguity about the dominance of the federal statutory goals in enforcing 
the state regulations. 
This interdependent relationship is distinct from the two fact set­
tings in which the Supreme Court has utilized the Burford doctrine. 
The core issues of those cases were state or local rules given substan­
tial deference by federal courts and operating independently from any 
federal legislation.96 No federal statutory scheme was at issue.97 
In the context of intertwined federal and state regulatory schemes, 
the Court has specifically rejected the applicability of the Burford doc­
trine. In New Orleans Public Service, Inc. v. Council of New Orleans 
("NOPSI''),98 the plaintiff nuclear power company challenged a local 
rate-making body's allocation among energy producers of Federal En­
ergy Regulatory Commission rate increases.99 Although the actions of 
a local regulator were at issue,100 the Court held that the suit's nucleus 
of federal issues precluded an application of Burford.101 Because 
RCRA similarly involves federal law operating through a state appa­
ratus, Burford abstention is inappropriate in the context of a citizen 
suit brought under the statute. 
2. State Regulatory Schemes 
RCRA's federal emphasis also disallows Burford abstention under 
95. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 6947(a) (West 1997). The EPA has continuing oversight over the 
state program and may modify or revoke the state's authority to operate under RCRA. See 
text accompanying notes 40-41 regarding the EPA's enforcement power. 
96. See Alabama Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. Southern Ry. Co., 341 U.S. 341, 347 (1951) 
(raising issues about local need for intrastate rail service); Burford v. Sun Oil, 319 U.S. 315, 
331 (1943) (involving the state regulation of oil drilling). 
97. See Southern Ry. Co., 341 U.S. at 349 (involving legality of state commission's order 
for railroad to continue intrastate rail service); Burford, 319 U.S. at 327, 331 (case centered 
on state commission's application of Texas oil and gas regulations). Even commentators 
favoring abstention agree that abstention must conform to statutory intent, not overrule it. 
See, e.g., Michael Wells, Why Professor Redish is Wrong About Abstention, 19 GA. L. REV. 
1097, 1103-1108 (1985) (abstention appropriate where a cause of action is judge-made rather 
than statutory). 
98. New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 358-64 (1989). 
NOPSI, along with Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706 (1996), are the Court's 
most recent discussions of Burford abstention. 
99. New Orleans Pub. Serv., 491 U.S. at 352-57 (suit raised preemption, due process, and 
takings issues). 
100. Indeed, the plaintiff also filed a suit in Louisiana state court. See 491 U.S. at 357-58 
& n3. 
101. See 491 U.S. at 361. 
October 1999] RCRA Citizen Suits and Abstention 287 
the theory that federal adjudication might disrupt the development of 
a state's whole policy or regulatory framework in some area.102 In the 
RCRA context, judicial determinations in favor of dismissal have 
failed to provide any reason why federal court review of a particular 
state administrative action would be disruptive to the state's policy as 
a whole.103 It is doubtful that a determination as to one defendant's 
compliance with federal and state law would disrupt the entire waste 
disposal policy of a state.104 
More importantly, such deference to a state's hazardous waste 
policy assumes that under RCRA, federal judges should give defer­
ence to the integrity of a state's individual program rather than to that 
of the federal program. The explicit goals and structure of RCRA run 
counter to a conclusion that the best interests of a state's program are 
at odds with federal oversight. The only situation where a state's pol­
icy might be affected by adjudication would be one in which a state 
had exercised its right to enact stricter standards than the federal stat­
ute required.105 In this case, however, violations of the state's unique 
rule would not be actionable under the federal RCRA cause of ac­
tion.106 Abstaining from hearing a RCRA suit on Burford grounds is 
inappropriate because it requires the federal court to ignore the fed­
eral-state structure of the statute. 
102 See 491 U.S. at 363 (" '[T]here is . . .  no doctrine requiring abstention merely be­
cause resolution of a federal question may result in the overturning of a state policy.' ") 
(citing Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 380 n.5 (1978)). 
103. See Coalition for Health Concern v. LWD, Inc., 60 F.3d 1188, 1195 (6th Cir. 1995) 
(concluding, without explanation, that adjudication would interfere with state's policy); Da­
vies v. National Coop. Refinery Ass'n, 963 F. Supp. 990, 999 (D. Kan. 1997) (abstaining be­
cause interference with state agency's activities could undercut efforts by Kansas to develop 
a coherent hazardous waste policy). 
104. See Morton College Bd. of Trustees v. Town of Cicero, 18 F. Supp. 2d 921, 927 
(N.D. Ill. 1998) (rejecting defendant's claim that federal court adjudication would disrupt 
Illinois's environmental policy). One court has abstained partly on the basis that the policy 
impact of the case would transcend the results of the litigation itself. See Sugarloaf Citizens 
Ass'n v. Montgomery County, No. 93-2475, 1194 WL 447442, at *3 (4th Cir. Aug. 17, 1994). 
This reasoning appears to reflect a concern that the court's adjudication would amount to 
legislative, rather than judicial, action. If a court finds the task before it to be truly legisla­
tive in character, it should dismiss the action on ripeness grounds, not under Burford. See 
NOPSI, 491 U.S. 350, 372 (1989); see also Young, supra note 2, at 886-900 (discussing 
blurred distinctions over time between "legislative," "executive," and "judicial" legal forms, 
and the mystification of the administrative law process at the time Burford doctrine devel­
oped). 
105. States are free to enact stricter standards than the federal statute requires. See 42 
U.S.C.A. § 6929 (West 1997). 
106. Where state standards are identical to RCRA regulations, violations of a state 
permit in a state approved to regulate in lieu of RCRA continue to be actionable under fed­
eral law. See, e.g., § 6928(a)(2) (authorizing suit by EPA regarding violation of a state's haz­
ardous waste program). 
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3. Specialized State Court Review 
The final rationale for Burford abstention of RCRA citizen suits, 
that the state has developed a specialized court process for review of 
state administrative decisions, is unpersuasive for three reasons: the 
purpose underlying the state court review requirement, which seeks to 
protect plaintiffs' interests if their federal case is dismissed; the failure 
of a state court procedural rule to supply a substantive state interest; 
and the opportunity such a rule would provide to circumvent the fed­
eral statute. 
First, the rationale behind Burford's state court review rule, 
providing fairness to litigants, weighs heavily against abstention. 
Under RCRA, Congress has conferred exclusive jurisdiction on the 
federal courts for the vindication of a statutory right.107 Citizen 
plaintiffs cannot pursue their RCRA claims if a federal court abstains 
under Burford. 
The second reason weighing against using state court review as a 
ground for abstention is that a state's establishment of a specialized 
state court review process does not provide a state interest that over­
rides RCRA's statutory jurisdictional grants.108 The federal or state 
nature of a statutory scheme stems from its substantive subject matter, 
not from the procedural trappings of one system or another.109 In 
passing RCRA, Congress clearly delineated the substantive federal is­
sues at stake. 
Third, federal court abstention based on state court reviewability 
creates an opportunity for recalcitrant states to avoid federal judicial 
review under RCRA by developing "specialized" state court proce­
dures that the state claims are central to the development of a state 
waste disposal policy. Such procedures, which could be as simple as 
assigning challenges to state administrative procedures to a court in a 
particular county,110 would allow a state to become the final judge of 
107. See supra notes 64-78 and accompanying text; see also White & Brewer Trucking, 
Inc. v. Donley, 952 F. Supp. 1306, 1311 (C.D. Ill. 1997) (holding that exclusive federal cause 
of action for RCRA citizen suits prevents application of Burford). The White & Brewer 
Trucking court applied the Seventh Circuit's standard for Burford abstention under General 
Ry. Signal Co. v. Corcoran, 921 F.2d 700, 708-09 (7th Cir. 1991), which explicitly considers 
whether the cause of action is exclusively federal as part of its Burford analysis. See White & 
Brewer Trucking, 952 F. Supp. at 1311. 
108. See White & Brewer Trucking, 952 F. Supp. at 1313 {allowing RCRA claim despite 
fact that plaintiffs could have participated in state administrative review process, partially 
because plaintiffs can only raise section 6972 claims before federal court). But see Coalition 
for Health Concern, 60 F.3d at 1194 (process of review for permit issuance is evidence of 
Kentucky's interest in developing a coherent state policy); Ada-Cascade Watch Co. v. Cas­
cade Resource Recovery, Inc., 720 F.2d 897, 905 (6th Cir. 1983) (finding that centralized re­
view in a single state court is evidence of Michigan's interest); Friends of Santa Fe County v. 
LAC Minerals, Inc., 892 F. Supp. 1333, 1348 (D.N.M. 1995). 
109. See supra note 83. 
110. See Ada-Cascade Watch Co., 720 F2d at 905 (holding that Michigan had manifested 
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its solid and hazardous waste decisions, and thus would defeat the 
statutory mandate in favor of ongoing federal oversight. 
B. Permitting and Siting Challenges 
RCRA's expansive jurisdictional grants leave a federal court with 
little discretion as to whether to decline jurisdiction of a citizen suit. 
Some citizen suits, however, amount solely to challenges of permitting 
or siting determinations. These suits make no claim that the defen­
dant company has violated a permit or that the disposal plan will be 
endangering for reasons not considered by the permitting agency; 
rather, they question the validity of the agency's permitting or siting 
determination. The Fourth and Sixth Circuits have abstained from 
hearing such citizen suits by invoking the Burford doctrine.111 In turn, 
these decisions have paved the way for courts to use the doctrine to 
decline jurisdiction in other types of RCRA citizen suits.112 
This section argues that Congress did not intend for citizen suits to 
provide a federal forum for the review of solid or hazardous waste 
disposal permits or siting determinations, but instead, designed the 
statute so that the permitting and siting decisions of the EPA and state 
agencies would have res judicata effect on this type of citizen suit 
challenge. Section II.B.1 illustrates that RCRA's broad jurisdictional 
grant does not extend to suits that simply challenge an agency's per­
mitting or siting decision. Section II.B.2 maintains that the statutorily 
provided review process regarding permitting and siting determina­
tions should be plaintiffs' exclusive forum as long as they were granted 
a full hearing of the issues subsequently raised in the RCRA citizen 
suit. This statutory exclusion obviates the necessity for courts to em­
ploy the Burford abstention doctrine to dismiss RCRA citizen suits 
that challenge permits and siting. 
1. Statutory Bars 
The broad statutory authority for RCRA citizen suits does not ex­
tend to actions that are simply appeals of state or EPA permitting or 
siting decisions. Two specific jurisdictional limits illustrate that Con­
gress did not intend citizen suits to provide an avenue for permitting 
or siting appeals.113 
desire for coherent policy by centralizing review of hazardous waste management in one 
county's circuit court; centralization allowed that court to gain expertise in the field). 
111. See supra note 9 
112 See supra note 10. 
113. A citizen suit plaintiff could sue the governmental agency directly regarding an im­
properly issued permit, subject to Eleventh Amendment limitations. See 42 U.S.C.A. 
§ 6972(a)(l)(A) (West 1997). 
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The first jurisdictional limit, section 6976(b ), constrains the forum 
for all EPA-issued permit challenges to circuit court review within 
ninety days of the permitting decision.114 Section 6976(b) further 
states that after the 90 days have passed, the terms of permits may not 
be challenged in any suit for enforcement.115 Because the provision 
describes the barred claims as "enforcement suits," some commenta­
tors116 and plaintiffs have claimed that the jurisdictional bar applies 
only to "enforcement" suits, which challenge violations of the statute 
or a permit,117 and not to "imminent endangerment" suits, which chal­
lenge conditions that pose an immediate danger to the environment.118 
This "plain meaning" reading accomplishes a result contrary to the 
structure of the statute as a whole. 
The jurisdictional bar applies to both types of RCRA citizen suits 
for two reasons.119 First, including endangerment suits in the sec­
tion 6976(b) provision would have appeared unnecessary at the time 
Congress passed the provision. The original purpose of section 
6976(b) was to preclude defendants from challenging the terms of 
their RCRA permits as a defense to EPA, state, or citizen enforce-
114. See § 6976(b) ("Review of the Administrator's action . . .  may be had by any inter­
ested person in the Circuit Court of Appeals of the United States . . . . Action of the Ad­
ministrator with respect to which review could have been obtained under this subsection shall 
not be subject to judicial review in civil or criminal proceedings for enforcement. Such review 
shall be in accordance with sections 701 through 706 of [The Administrative Procedure 
Act]." (emphasis added)). 
115. See § 6976(b). This bar applies to state-issued permits, as well. See 40 C.F.R. § 
271.14(b)(1998). That provision makes 40 C.F.R. § 270.4(a) applicable to state programs. 
Section 270.4(a) reads, "compliance with a RCRA permit during its term constitutes compli­
ance, for purposes of enforcement, with subtitle C ofRCRA . . . .  " § 270.4(a). 
116. See Schannauer, supra note 43, at 287-92, 317. 
117. See § 6972(a)(l)(A). 
118. See § 6972(a){l)(B). One commentator has defined the "inuninent and substantial 
endangerment" cause of action as one alleging a "significant potential risk of eventual envi­
ronmental harm." See Adam Babich, RCRA Imminent Hazard Authority: A Powerful Tool 
for Businesses, Governments, and Citizen Enforcers, ALI-ABA Course of Study, Environ­
mental Law (C883 ALI-ABA 81), Feb. 17-19, 1994, at 97. Courts have described the provi­
sion as a federalization of the common law nuisance claim. See Middlesex City Bd. of Cho­
sen Freeholders v. New Jersey, 645 F. Supp. 715, 721-22 (D.N.J. 1986). 
119. The judicial review provision was copied from identical language in the Clean 
Water Act and Clean Air Act, neither of which have imminent endangerment causes of 
action. See S. REP. No. 96-172, at 5 {1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5019, 5024. 
Congress added the estoppel language to RCRA, however, as part of the same amendment 
in which RCRA's imminent endangerment provisions were added. See H.R. REP. No. 98-
198, pt. 1, at 47-49 {1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5576, 5606-08. The chronology of 
the amendments is thus ambiguous: on one hand, Congress may have used generic statutory 
language for environmental legislation and failed to consider the necessity of broader 
language for RCRA's judicial review provision; on the other hand, Congress must have 
considered that necessity because the endangerment provisions were specifically on the table 
at the time, and rejected estoppel that would preclude permit or siting challenges as part of 
an endangerment citizen suit. 
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ment of the statute.120 While endangerment suits have now been 
brought against permitted facilities, the jurisdictional provision had in 
the past only been used to address abandoned or dormant facilities 
that had not undergone a permitting process.121 Thus there would 
have appeared no possibility that endangerment suit defendants could 
mount a permit challenge defense, making the bar of section 6976(b) 
irrelevant to that type of suit. 
Second, applying the permit-challenge bar only to enforcement 
suits would interpret the section in a manner that conflicts with other 
provisions of RCRA. In other parts of the Act, the jurisdictional grant 
for enforcement suits is more generous than that for endangerment 
suits. The endangerment provision requires a longer waiting period 
between the time notice is given to the defendant and governmental 
officials and the time suit is filed.122 In addition, the endangerment 
cause of action is precluded by a wider variety of governmental reme­
dial steps.123 It would be illogical to grant a stricter jurisdictional bar 
on enforcement suits, the more encouraged provision in the statutory 
scheme, than on endangerment suits. 
Allowing citizen suits as an alternative route for permitting and 
siting challenges would create one further, serious statutory inconsis­
tency: the scope of judicial review of the agency's decision would be 
different under the permit-review provision than under the permit­
challenge citizen suit. The scope of judicial review under section 
6976(b) of RCRA occurs pursuant to the standards of the Administra­
tive Procedure Act ("AP A").124 For purposes of reviewing RCRA de­
cisions, the AP A allows judicial reversal only where the agency's deci­
sion is arbitrary and capricious, without ob�ervance of required 
procedures or unsupported by substantial evidence.125 This standard is 
deferential to the agency.126 
120. See H.R. REP. No. 98-198, pt. 1 at 55 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5576, 
5614 ("Addition of this language . . .  would clarify that defendants in Federal enforcement 
proceedings cannot challenge permit terms and conditions or State program provisions if 
such provisions could have been challenged in the courts of appeals at the time the permit 
was issued."). 
121. See Schannauer, supra note 43 at 291. Under the EP A's parallel authority to bring 
analogous inlminent endangerment suits under section 6973, all actions to date have in­
volved non-permitted facilities. See id. at 319-320. 
122. See supra note 28. 
123. See supra note 32. 
124. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 6976(b) (West 1997) ("Such review shall be in accordance with 
sections 701 through 706 of Title 5 [the judicial review provisions of the Administrative Pro­
cedure Act]."). 
125. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), (D), (E) (1994). 
126. See Motor Vehicle Manufacturers' Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 
U.S. 29, 43 (1983) ("The scope of review under the 'arbitrary and capricious' standard is nar­
row and a court is not to substitute its judgment for that of the agency."). 
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In hearing a citizen suit, on the other hand, a district court looks at 
all issues of endangerment on a blank slate and would labor under no 
such statutory restraints.127 The statute cannot plausibly contain such 
disparate review standards based merely on the plaintiff's choice of 
statutory provision. 
In summary, the history of section 6976(b), the jurisdictional 
treatment of endangerment suits compared to enforcement suits, and 
the inconsistent scopes of review between the permit-review and citi­
zen suit provisions all demonstrate that section 6976(b) should apply 
with equal force whether a plaintiff brings an endangerment or en­
forcement suit regarding a permitted facility. A citizen suit may not 
function as an alternate route to the circuit court for appeal of a per­
mitting decision of the EP A.128 
The second jurisdictional bar, section 6972(b )(2)(D), prohibits 
imminent endangerment suits as a challenge to either EPA or state 
siting or permitting of a "hazardous waste treatment, storage, or a dis­
posal facility."129 The fact that the provision mentions hazardous 
waste and not solid waste again reflects a failure to anticipate the 
breadth of purposes for which imminent endangerment suits have 
come to be used. 
The inclusion of section 6972(b)(2)(D) reflected a realization that 
citizen plaintiffs might otherwise use their imminent endangerment 
authority, an "emergency" provision, to challenge the siting of haz­
ardous waste facilities.130 Including solid waste siting and permitting in 
the bar would have appeared unnecessary. RCRA defines "hazardous 
waste" as solid waste that could be endangering to human health or 
the environment.131 Only hazardous waste, therefore, would seem to 
present conditions giving rise to an imminent endangerment cause of 
127. No citizen suit provision mentions any deference to any permitting terms. This si­
lence is consistent with the thesis of this Note that citizen suits are not meant as permit­
challenge mechanisms. 
128. See Greenpeace, Inc. v. Waste Techs. Indus., 9 F.3d 1174, 1178 (6th Cir. 1993) {de­
scribing citizen suit as "improper collateral attack on the prior permitting decisions of the 
U.S. EPA"); Palumbo v. Waste Techs. Indus., 989 F.2d 156, 159 (4th Cir. 1993) (overruled 
on other grounds) (citizen suit may not replace direct appeal procedure under § 6976(b)). 
129. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 6972(b)(2)(D) (West 1997) ("No action may be commenced un­
der subsection (a)(l)(B) of this section by any person (other than a State or local govern­
ment) with respect to the siting of a hazardous waste treatment, storage or a disposal facility, 
nor to restrain or enjoin the issuance of a permit for such facility."). 
130. The legislative history indicates that the imminent endangerment provision was de­
signed to respond to hazardous waste emergencies. See H.R. REP. No. 98-198, pt. 1, at 118-
19 {1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5576, 5634-35. 
131. See § 6903(5) (" 'hazardous waste' means a solid waste, . . .  [which may] (A) cause, 
or significantly contribute to an increase in mortality or an increase in serious irreversible, or 
incapacitating reversible, illness; or (B) pose a substantial present or potential hazard to hu­
man health or the environment when improperly treated, stored, transported, or disposed of, 
or otherwise managed"). 
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action.132 Permitting and siting decisions regarding non-hazardous 
solid waste disposal are inherently outside the scope of RCRA's grant 
of jurisdiction under the imminent endangerment provision. 
The 1984 House Report regarding section 6972(b)(2)(D) confirms 
this reading, concluding that "other legal authority [besides citizen 
suits] is available to challenge deficiencies in the permitting proc­
ess. "133 To read the statute as creating an exception for citizen suits 
that challenge solid waste disposal permits reaches an absurd result: 
citizen plaintiffs would have more authority under the endangerment 
provision to challenge solid waste disposal than hazardous waste dis­
posal, even though the latter category is defined by its potential for 
endangerment.134 
Congress intended neither the enforcement nor endangerment 
RCRA citizen suit provisions to provide an alternate route for direct 
permit appeal. Admittedly, no single statutory provision spells out a 
blanket prohibition on citizen suits as permit challenges. Yet when 
the statutory authority disallowing particular types of such actions is 
taken together, as Table 1 demonstrates, it is apparent that Congress 
did not consider citizens' dissatisfaction with siting or permitting deci­
sions, without any other complaint, to state a cause of action under 
RCRA. 
Table 1. Provisions barring permitting/siting challenges 







Hazardous Waste Permit 
6972(b)(2)(D) 
6976(b) 
Solid Waste Permit 
[Combination of both pro-
visions suggest this quad-
rant is barred as well] 
6976(b) 
132. See H.R. Rep. 98-198, pt 1, at 47 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5576, 5606. 
The legislative history notes that the EPA's parallel imminent endangerment authority ex­
tends to "all wastes that meet the statutory definition of hazardous waste (section 1004(5))." 
Id. 
133. H.R. REP. No. 98-198, pt 1, at 53 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5576, 
5612. 
134. See generally 40 C.F.R. § 270.4 (1998) ("Compliance with a RCRA permit during 
its term constitutes compliance, for purposes of enforcement, with subtitle C of RCRA ex­
cept for those requirements not included in the permit . . . .  "). 
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2. Other Opportunities for Hearing 
Although RCRA's citizen suit relief is unavailable for siting and 
permit challenges, other legal procedures allow public participation 
during the process of site determination and issuance or denial of 
permits. RCRA protects citizens by building a number of procedural 
opportunities into the requirements of the permitting and siting proc­
ess. These mechanisms allow some form of citizen involvement at all 
stages of the regulatory process. 
Opportunities for public participation extend to siting and the is­
suance of permits. Before issuing any permit, the EPA must provide 
public notice of its intent and must hold hearings if it receives written 
notice of opposition to the permit.135 In order for a state to be 
authorized to operate in lieu of the EPA, the state must abide by 
equivalent notice and hearing requirements.136 RCRA also provides 
that "any person" may petition for the promulgation, amendment, or 
repeal of any regulations.137 
Once the EPA has reached a permitting decision, citizen plaintiffs 
may appeal directly to a federal circuit court.138 While RCRA does 
not specify a method of appeal for state-issued permits, the availability 
of judicial review under a state's program is taken into account by the 
EPA when it decides whether to approve the state's program.139 This 
emphasis on congressionally required opportunities to participate in 
the proceedings and to appeal supports the notion that the statute cre­
ates a route for citizen input within the permitting and siting process 
that citizen suits may not circumvent. 
Permit challenges through citizen suits should still be available in 
certain limited circumstances: where new issues arise after the issu­
ance of the permit and appellate review is no longer available;140 or 
where, under a state-approved program, the plaintiffs have not been 
allowed to participate in the permitting process or to obtain judicial 
review of the permit. Other than these situations, there is no statutory 
authority under RCRA to use a citizen suit as a permit or siting ap­
peal. The use of Burford dismissals rather than statutory authority to 
135. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 6974(b )(2) (West 1997). 
136. See § 6974(b )(2) ("No State program which provides for the issuance of permits re­
ferred to in this paragraph may be authorized by the Administrator under section 6926 of 
this title unless such program provides for the notice and hearing required by the para­
graph."). 
137. See § 6974(a). 
138. See § 6976(b ). Review "may be had by any interested person." Id. 
139. See 40 C.F.R. 271.14 (x), (y), (z), (aa). These provisions refer the reader to regula­
tions applicable to approved state programs operating under the Clean Water Act. See 40 
C.F.R. 124.10, 124.11, 124.12(a), 124.17. 
140. See § 6976(b). 
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dismiss such suits has lead to a distortion of the doctrine and to dis­
missals of other types of RCRA suits that were properly before a 
court. 
*** 
Burford allows a federal court to avoid a collision with distinctively 
local regulatory schemes, not to substitute its judgment for that of 
Congress about what types of state court action should preclude a 
RCRA citizen suit. Where, as in RCRA, Congress has created a com­
prehensive, national, legislative scheme, a federal court lacks the 
power to redefine the issue as "local," and to reassess when it should 
assume jurisdiction. For suits which simply amount to challenges of a 
permitting or siting process, federal courts need not resort to absten­
tion to refuse jurisdiction because there is no statutory authority for 
citizen suits in those situations. For other kinds of RCRA citizen suits, 
federal courts must assume jurisdiction unless the statutorily defined 
enforcement action has been undertaken. 
III. .ABSTENTION AND THE VALUES OF FEDERALISM 
Given the specificity and breadth of RCRA's statutory scheme, ab­
staining from hearing a RCRA citizen suit is outside the established 
boundaries of the Burford and primary jurisdiction doctrines. Even 
beyond the statutory mandate, abstention fails to serve the values of 
federalism claimed by pro-abstention advocates. Courts and commen­
tators have credited federalism with advancing a number of benefits, 
including the opportunity for citizen involvement, a government more 
responsive to its citizens through interstate competition and innova­
tion and experimentation in government.141 Proponents of federalism 
have also identified a normative function: avoiding overreaching by 
the national government by reserving some affairs for state govern­
ments.142 When the Supreme Court has rejected national legislation 
on federalism grounds, it has responded primarily to this value.143 
This Part argues that judicial abstention from RCRA citizen suits 
does not advance these values of federalism. Section III.A demon-
141. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 457 (1991) (listing values). Academic dis­
cussions of federalism's benefits include Erwin Chemerinsky, The Values of Federalism, 47 
FLA. L. REV. 499, 524-30, 533-39 (1995), and Rubin & Feeley, supra note 1, at 907. This dis­
cussion does not exhaust all values claimed on behalf of federalism. For an example of other 
suggested benefits, see SAMUEL H. BEER, To MAKE A NATION: THE REDISCOVERY OF 
AMERICAN FEDERALISM 386-88 (1993) (discussing values of co=unity, utility, and lib­
erty). 
142 See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 188 (1992). 
143. The New York opinion alludes to this focus by noting that the Constitution would 
require a vertical separation of powers between the national government and the states even 
if "federalism secured no advantages to anyone." 505 U.S. at 157. 
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strates that the statutory framework of RCRA explicitly addresses the 
instrumentalist benefits of federalism. Section III.B argues that 
constitutional doctrine amply addresses federalism's normative claim 
and is compromised by common law additions. 
A. Instrumentalist Values 
RCRA already takes into account federalism's claimed benefits of 
responsiveness, innovation, and citizen involvement. The statute's 
structure of cooperative federalism seeks to build the values of re­
sponsiveness and innovation into the waste disposal scheme. RCRA 
citizen suits directly involve citizen participation, a value which ab­
stention can make no plausible claim to advance. 
Acting alone, state and local governments may face heavy pressure 
to lower their environmental standards.144 Competition among states 
may translate better into a competition for businesses who prefer 
minimal environmental regulation than into a contest for the cleanest 
waste program.145 The problems of economic competition, along with 
externalities created when one state's pollution affects another state's 
environment,146 identify the field as one justifying national legislation 
in some fashion.147 
Supporters of the values of federalism should view cooperative 
federal-state statutes such as RCRA as the best type of national legis­
lation: the statute aims to preserve some state autonomy rather than 
to preempt the field altogether. RCRA facilitates government re­
sponsiveness and innovation by encouraging states to operate pro­
grams in lieu of its statutory terms,148 an approach which allows state 
agencies flexibility in their approaches to solid and hazardous waste 
disposal.149 RCRA balances those local advantages against the need 
for national minimum standards by eliminating competition based on 
safety levels.150 Broadly applied, a body of abstention dismissals dis-
144. See Adam Babich, Symposium, Environmental Federalism: Our Federalism, Our 
Hazardous Waste, and Our Good Fortune, 54 MD. L. REv. 1516, 1532, 1537 (1995) (hereinaf­
ter "Our Federalism"); Hodas, supra note 38, at 1615-16. 
145. See Hodas, supra note 38. 
146. See Donald H. Regan, How to Think About the Federal Commerce Power and Inci-
dentally Rewrite United States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REV. 554, 608-610 {1995). 
147. See id. 
148. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 6926 (West 1997). 
149. See § 6902(a)(7) (listing objective of federal-state partnership as "giv[ing] a high 
priority to assisting and cooperating with States in obtaining full authorization of State pro­
grams."); see also Babich, supra note 144, at 1531 ("The 'built-in restraints' protecting the 
states' primacy in their traditional domains are reflected in Congress's practice of pursuing 
environmental protection . . .  through 'programs of cooperative federalism' . . . .  "). 
150. See J. William Futrell, The Administration of Environmental Law, in SUSTAINABLE 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 93, 118 (Celia Campbell-Mohn et al. eds., 1993). 
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courages such cooperative arrangements by sending a message to 
Congress that federal law preemption is necessary to create enforce­
able solid and hazardous waste standards. 
Abstention has an even weaker claim regarding the third instru­
mentalist value, that of promoting citizen involvement. This value ad­
dresses the comparative ease of taking part in a local legislative proc­
ess as opposed to a national one.151 To the extent that this assumption 
has force, it is inapplicable to the arena of judicial review. When citi­
zens have an interest that becomes sufficiently pronounced to bring 
suit in a court,152 the jurisdictional grant under RCRA enables them 
access to a regulatory process that is no more cumbersome for being 
federal rather than state or local. Where federal courts abstain from 
such suits, it is hard to imagine how citizen involvement is enhanced: 
the plaintiffs cannot bring suit,153 and there is no other group whose 
participatory opportunities increase. 
RCRA accommodates both the instrumentalist values of federal­
ism and the necessity for some national action in order to achieve en­
vironmental goals. RCRA explicitly preserves an active role for states 
and promotes public participation through citizen suits, the very ave­
nue that abstention would obstruct. 
B. Diffusion of Power 
Federalism's normative claim of power diffusion between the na­
tional and state governments also fails to support an application of ab­
stention doctrines. The Supreme Court's evolving federalism juris­
prudence has rested mainly on this claim, rejecting federal laws that 
require states to enact specific legislation154 or engage the efforts of 
state executive officers.155 One might argue that abstention should rest 
on this view as well, acting as a weak lower court signal that comple­
ments and reinforces the constitutional federalism doctrines. This 
view is misguided. 
The constitutional analysis developing in the Supreme Court's fed­
eralism jurisprudence has foreclosed several avenues through which 
Congress can create federal-state partnerships in order to bring about 
national, uniform legislation.156 The Court, however, has retained two 
important methods as constitutional: conditional grants, where a state 
151. See Rubin & Feeley, supra note 1, at 915. 
152. Both the costs of litigation and the federal rules of standing constrain this event. 
153. See supra notes 65-79 and accompanying text. 
154. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 188 (1992). 
155. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997). 
156. See, e.g., Printz, 521 U.S. at 932-33 (holding unconstitutional federal law that en­
listed state officials to perform federal administrative functions); New York, 505 U.S. at 188 
(holding unconstitutional federal law that "commandeered" state legislatures). 
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must enact particular legislation in return for optional federal fund­
ing;157 and conditional preemption, the statutory scheme employed 
under RCRA, where a state chooses either to regulate pursuant to 
federal guidelines or to allow the federal government to regulate the 
field itself.158 Because each of these statutory structures allows state 
governments to choose whether or not to participate in the federal 
plan,159 the Supreme Court considers them a minimal threat to state 
autonomy.160 
Abstention from RCRA citizen suits on common law federalism 
grounds ignores the balance established by the Supreme Court in the 
constitutional arena. In disallowing certain types of federal-state ar­
rangements created by Congress, the Court implicitly relied on the 
permissibility of other mechanisms as a means for Congress and states 
to create cooperative working relationships.161 Lower federal courts 
should not understand the Supreme Court's federalism doctrine as a 
cry to arms against any intergovernmental cooperation but rather rec­
ognize that restrictive rules in some areas are balanced against expan­
sive rules in others.162 
The growth of constitutional federalism should thus discourage 
lower federal courts from abstaining from a suit whose underlying 
federal statute passes constitutional muster. Rather than adopting the 
position that if a little federalism doctrine is good, even more will be 
better, federal courts should take into account the federalism struc-
157. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987) (allowing Congress to condition 
grant of highway funds upon states imposing a specific drinking age limit). 
158. See FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 763-66 (1982); see also New York, 505 U.S. 
at 145. 
159. Some commentators have complained that states are not really free to decline a 
conditional grant. See, e.g., Thomas R. McCoy & Barry Friedman, Conditional Spending: 
Federalism's Trojan Horse, 1988 SUP. Cr. REV. 85, 119 (discussing, among other theories, 
idea that "choices" offered by Congress are illusory). Others dispute the idea that states are 
powerless faced with Congressional incentives. See Roderick M. Hills, The Political Econ­
omy of Cooperative Federalism: Why State Autonomy Makes Sense and "Dual Sovereignty" 
Doesn't, 96 MICH. L. REV. 813, 871-91 (1998). Hills argues that states have the ability to 
bargain during the legislative process and later during the grant application process, at the 
time the federal government decides exactly how the state will be regulated, and by declin­
ing a grant when the program would entail special opportunity costs for the state. See id. 
160. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 188 (1992). One commentator has 
claimed that some provisions of RCRA are unconstitutional as "commandeering" pursuant 
to Printz v. United States. See Jonathan H. Adler, Comment, The Green Aspects of Printz: 
The Revival of Federalism and Its Implications for Environmental Law, 6 GEO. MASON L. 
REv. 573, 615-16 (1998) (discussing regulation of underground storage tanks). 
161. See New York, 505 U.S. at 188. 
162 See Evan Cantinker, Context and Complementarity Within Federalism Doctrines, 22 
HARV. J.L. PUB. POL'Y 161, 163-66 (1998). Cantinker advances the theory that courts might 
accommodate the enforcement of federal norms and concerns for state dignity across a set of 
doctrines rather than within the precise delineation of a single rule. See id. 
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tures developed by the Court that already limit and shape congres­
sional power over the states. 
CONCLUSION 
In enacting RCRA, Congress fashioned a comprehensive regula­
tory scheme dependant on the interplay among various governmental 
actors performing specific roles. When a federal court forgoes juris­
diction over a RCRA citizen suit under Burford abstention or primary 
jurisdiction, it frustrates the congressional scheme and misapplies 
those common law doctrines. 
Dismissals of RCRA citizen suits on primary jurisdiction grounds 
fail to recognize that the jurisdictional gaps necessary to apply the 
doctrine are absent from RCRA. Such dismissals thwart the policy 
considerations of uniformity, technical expertise, and fairness to 
plaintiffs. The core prerequisites for Burford abstention, distinctively 
local law issues and an independent state regulatory process, are 
absent from a RCRA citizen suit. A state's provision of a centralized 
review process cannot remedy those absences for purposes of applying 
Burford. Cases where citizen suits amount to challenges of agency 
siting or permitting determinations should be dismissed on statutory, 
not Burford, grounds. 
While abstention may seem consistent with the new environment 
of state-centered federalism, dismissals of RCRA citizen suits on 
Burford or primary jurisdiction grounds thwart the values of 
federalism claimed by its proponents and discourage the development 
of coherent doctrines of constitutional federalism. Given a statute 
with sound constitutional footing, federal courts should respect the 
roles assigned to them by RCRA's framework and assume jurisdiction 
when the law so requires. 
